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ABSTRACT
Our paper deals with the tension that exists in the very name of bioethics, the tension between 
the natural and the ethical components. We examine the origin of the name “bioethics”, some 
of its present practices and issues, and anticipate future developments of this growing field. 
The past and the present do not bring an accepted resolution of the tension in question, and 
our hope is that by focusing on its significance, further research can clarify and define the very 
identity of the field. 
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Introduction
When in 1972 Michel Foucault introduced the term biopolitics1, he established a 
notion that brings together a set of developments and researches traditionally 
belonging to different fields. In its internal complexity this notion implies an 
analysis of different discursive practices inherent to the fields of politics, economics, 
philosophy, sociology, anthropology, biology, and medicine, which, in turn, 
articulate a particular way of understanding what it means to be a human being. 
1 During his “Society Must Be Defended” lectures at Collège de France, 17 March, 1976.
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Foucault’s biopolitics primarily explores the connections between politics and life 
(bios). As a political discourse, it focuses on a strong aspect of state control which is 
exercised not only from an ideological point of view, but which also exerts influence 
over a “social body,” understood as both an individual body and the population as a 
whole. Not surprisingly, then, Foucault defined biopolitics as “the endeavor, begun 
in the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented to governmental 
practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings 
constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birth-rate, longevity, and race” 
(Foucault, 2003). As Denzin and Giardina point out, according to Foucault’s view, 
“in modernity, bios or the ‘life’ of the population increasingly comes to inform the 
way in which individuals are subject to the governmental control, surveillance, and 
regulation” (Denzin & Giardina, 2010, p. 220). Under Foucault perspective, 
biopolitics involves a set of discursive practices aiming to control (under the logic of 
governmentality) the life (biologically-defined) of the citizens of any polis. Formally, 
this governance is put into practice through sanitary controls and health care 
policies, which some authors define as the “politics of life.”
In general terms, the Foucault-inspired notion of biopolitics expresses the 
transformation of political actions and decisions over life, as they pertain to 
individual bodies and the population understood as a “social living being.” These 
new types of political actions were developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, when life became an object of “calculation” in different strategies of the 
state power. It is clear that Foucault separates power from the circumscribed scope 
of law; according to his broader conception, power flows through all the passageways 
of the social body and in all directions – not just from the top toward the bottom. 
Under a different perspective, Giorgio Agamben considers power within the scope 
of law. He examines what he understands as the limits of Foucault’s approach by 
explaining how the experience of the Nazi concentration camps can be understood 
as a turning point in which biopolitics served for the “death politics.” By introducing 
the technical notion “nudavida,” or bare life (la vita nuda, Gk. ζωή:  zoe), he 
maintains that the condition of the political subject in modernity is built under the 
perspective of the living being, an idea which rests in the consistence of a biological 
body.  
For Agamben, power is connected with law, under the paradigm of sovereignty. 
When this fundamental right is abolished, as happened under the Nazi regime, 
power embodied in its thanatic form serves the extermination processes. In contrast 
to Foucault, Agamben’s conception emphasizes a negative aspect of biopolitics. In 
line with this consideration we can argue that the Nüremberg trials were the 
occasion to establish several bioethical principles, and that, therefore, it was the 
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atrocities and violations of the fundamental human rights that first legitimized the 
growing need for bioethical reflection. 
This perspective shares common points with the ideas of the French philosopher 
Alain Badiou, who argues that ethics is exercised in a negative aspect when it serves 
to prevent evil. “What is the conception of ethics today? It’s a negative one, 
dominated by the problem of evil and the figure of the victim. To assist victims, to 
ensure the fundamental human rights against suffering: this is the specific content 
of ethics. The ethical imperative is applied following the reference of the evil scenery 
and its only objective is to prevent this from happening. I reflect on the beautiful 
formula of Paul Ricoeur: ‘suffering forced us’. Ethics is based on the obligation that 
arises from the fact that suffering is an unequivocal fact” (Badiou, 2000, p. 37).
What is the connection between these theoretical thinkers and the bioethical 
concerns that we will develop in this essay? From Foucault’s biopolitical perspective 
and the controversies presented in Agamben and Badiou’s work, we highlight not 
only the significance of bio (life, lives, bios, zoe), but also the consequences of the 
applications of these different meanings in daily practice. We start from the premise 
that every thought or reflection has its own historical conditions and that is why our 
approach will follow a long tradition (Nietzsche, Schweitzer, Foucault, etc.) of being 
a genealogical method. Analyzing the history of discursive practices and especially 
the power relations that they embody will give us a chance to contribute to the 
growing field of contemporary bioethics.
We will focus our attention to the evolution of the concept bioethics by considering 
that there are important consequences in the way we understand how bios (life) 
relates to ethics. This understanding affects how we approach the issues of dignity 
and living conditions of humans, animals, and plants. 
In the ancient Greece, the word “life” had two distinguished meanings: bios and zoe. 
Zoe was used to describe life in its general organic form, and bios to designate a 
human lifestyle – individual and embodied. The passage to our modern languages 
absorbs these two meanings in a single prefix: bio. Which concept of life (bios or 
zoe) are we considering when we address a bioethical dilemma? Is there any hierarchy 
between the notions of bios and zoe? Is bios supposed to dictate moral values (e.g., so 
that what is natural is more important than what is artificial), or is it the other way 
around (so that what is ethical – which may mean: of social origin, or non-natural, 
including scientific beliefs and practices – is more important than the natural and 
should dominate, or at least guide the natural (zoe)? How to determine this relation 
that is implicit in the very notion of bio-ethics?
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Genealogy of the term bioethics
The technological development confronts us nowadays with unexpected issues and 
unanswered questions. Several factors and “dispositifs”2 affect the cultural, economic, 
and social development of contemporary societies by creating huge challenges that 
undermine our entrenched convictions. The divergences of the modern political 
order, the ecological crisis, the emergence of new forms of violence, and the 
expansion of techno-scientific possibilities modify the foundations of our human 
condition. 
Does this technological revolution imply some kind of coercion over the human 
being and its environment? Could this revolution be understood as a new form of 
violence (e.g., ecological violence, weapons of mass destruction, totalitarian 
violence, etc.) over the symbolic foundation of our species? These inquiries have 
prompted many to search for the adequate answers. The ethical appeal of these 
questions seems to be, in different disciplinary fields, among the most important 
issues of our age. Yet what are we expecting as an adequate ethical answer? Could it 
be a new (ethical? political?) order formulated in terms of a fictional (and art-ificial) 
discourse about human existence? The question of human existence that arts 
explored in past centuries would, then, be restored by science in its own terms. Due 
to the scientific breakthroughs the traditional question of the human existence 
becomes blurred. As an Argentine psychoanalyst likes to say: “the scientist does not 
move back, the scientist produces his discovery, and only then moves back –and this 
is interesting because here appears the subjective dimension – the scientist only 
moves back after the consequences of his act: when he makes equations he does not 
move back, when everything explodes he suffers” (Ariel, 1994, p.19).
Science is often one step ahead of the symbolic capabilities of society to legitimize 
its effects and consequences. Due to the difficulties in the internalization of the 
ethical, bioethical, and human rights principles for complex cases, it is necessary to 
develop some methodological tools that question and broaden the established 
theories. The bioethical dilemmas present complex situations because there are no 
entrenched answers and because they involve many disciplines and different types of 
knowledge. That is why they cannot be easily resolved, and why they force us to 
raise the expectation bars and push us to search for deeper understanding of the 
human condition.
2 Michel Foucault generally uses the term “dispositif ” to refer to the various institutional, physical, and adminis-
trative mechanisms and knowledge-structures that enhance and maintain the exercise of power within the social 
body. Dispositif is translated variously, even in the same book, as ‘device’, ‘machinery’, ‘apparatus’, ‘construction’, 
and ‘deployment’. 
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Due to technological advances and social changes (industrial, medical, biological, 
political, etc.), the field of “human inquiries” has become problematized. Our main 
objective is to build some analytical categories that can help us to understand the 
complexity involved in the contemporary bioethical approach. These analytical and 
methodological tools will help us in the task of creating a bioethical way of thinking 
adequate to our Zeitgeist. But first it might be useful to contextualize the origins of 
the term bioethics. Establishing this genealogy will confront us with a history of 
understandings and misunderstandings between the scientific advance, the socio-
political background, and the past and forthcoming events and discourses.
The “bio” of bio-ethics opens to the field of the biological and symbolic meanings. 
That means that the “bio” of bio-ethics is not merely an organic bio; it is not only 
about “body” but also about life. This creates the first etymological problem of the 
connection between biology and biography (zoe and bios). The prefix bios that 
precedes the term ethics is controversial. As we mentioned before, if we refer to the 
etymological order, the Greek bios is understood in terms of life that exceed the 
organic or biological aspect of human bodies, since there was another term for it: 
zoe.
Following its etymological roots, bios is used to indicate or involve life or living 
organisms (biogenesis, biolysis); it is also used to indicate human life or career 
(biography, biopic). We could furthermore quote a combining form meaning “life,” 
“living organism,” and “biology” in the word “biodegradable.“Bios  is a noun, which 
stands for life – any form of organic life. 
There is only one Latin word, vita, and one English word, life, for the two Greek 
terms. If zoe and bios were synonyms, this would not be a problem. But zoe and bios 
view life from different perspectives and so are not synonymous. Inevitably, by using 
one word to translate both Greek words, we have concealed some important 
differences between them. While zoe refers to intensive life, bios denotes extensive 
life, the period or duration of life. In the secondary sense, bios also refers to the 
means by which that life is sustained. And in a tertiary sense, bios signifies the 
manner in which that life is spent, that is, one’s career or a course of life.
With the advent of modernity the biological and social body moved to the center 
stage by becoming an analysis-variable of modern biopolitics: birth rates, mortality, 
diseases rate, etc. The bios, then, does not stop sharing the dimensions of social life 
in biological bodies, but in certain situations one of its meanings becomes more 
significant than the other. For example, under Foucault perspective the term bios is 
related to biopower, meaning the application and impact of political power on all 
aspects of human life. 
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From the perspective of ethical analysis, there might be no need to place a prefix 
that narrows the scope of the field. Ethics as a cross-category should deal with or 
address the multiplicity of issues related to life and living. Going back to Fritz Jahr 
views, bioethics defines a perspective that is not limited to human beings but 
includes animals and plants, as well as the human living conditions in a shared 
environment.  
This brief overview of the term bios implies that the use of this prefix will not be 
without consequences. Our intention is to recover the complexity of the prefix so it 
will not be limited to the organic or biological aspect of the human body, nor to the 
sphere of social life that involves only human bodies. It should include and 
anticipate life in its multiple aspects: biological, political, social, and singularly 
contextualized. It relates to life that cannot be without others, just as it cannot be 
without care and respect for the surrounding environment: a life framed in terms of 
the epimeleia heautou, a life of self-care based on an individual responsibility (first), 
the familiar (second), and the social (third). This is life of responsibility toward 
others and toward the environment (self-care ethics).
More precisely, bios is about social lives – of people and among people – for man is a 
being of values. These values refer to the rational aspect of man where the ideals are 
held, the rational part that enables our lives is society. If a society is not directed 
according to values – such as the idea of good or justice – it cannot be organized 
according to the moral or social dispositions. We do know, however, that this 
rational part of man is not the only one that affects human action and judgment; 
there are unconscious forces that lead us to act beyond (and beneath) normative and 
social standards. In the book Civilization and its Discontents [Das Unbehagen in der 
Kultur, 1930] Freud establishes that people are driven by two conflicting central 
impulses: the life drive (Libido or Eros) that leads us to sustain and develop our 
existence, and the death drive (Thanatos), which leads us toward destruction and 
violence. Freud points out three main sources of discontent we need to overcome: 
our own painful and mortal existence, the cruel and destructive aspects of the 
natural world, and the suffering endemic to the reality that we must live with other 
human beings in a society. Common social norms restrain our possibilities of 
happiness. This means that the accepted values are a set of propositions agreed on 
and shared in a certain time-period (declarations, codes of ethics, and legislations, 
according to the deontological ethical framework) that establish or prescribe the 
duties which enable our communal life. Our intention will be to analyze how the 
problematic issues of bioethics (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, reprogenetics) might 
challenge these normative principles which intended to be all-encompassing, but 
which always turn out to be insufficient for answering the most difficult concerns of 
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human existence. The vicissitudes of mankind introduces what is disruptive: drives, 
impulses, and passions are the inexorable destiny of humans. Freud points out the 
fundamental paradox of our civilization: it is a tool we have created to protect 
ourselves from unhappiness, and yet it is our largest source of unhappiness. He 
realizes that, although human lives should be directed according to values, values are 
continuously subjected to reconsiderations, adjustments, and improvements. The 
aim of presenting here a few steps of this genealogy is to introduce some 
representative ideas that shape the very heart of this problem.
We do not have, and may never obtain, a definitive “birth certificate” of bioethics. 
Its origin, however, is clearly related to a growing opposition to the mechanistic 
understanding of nature in general and life in particular. Seen from this broader 
context, it is clear that one crucially important precursor of the development of 
bioethics is Charles Darwin, with his theory of evolution and natural selection. 
While Descartes imagined that we would be able to prove one day that animals are 
nothing but machines, Darwin’s theory undermines Descartes’ view by postulating 
a mechanism of evolution that is driven by a struggle for survival, the mechanism 
that only remotely resembles the mechanistic principles that Descartes was looking 
for. Henry Bergson tried to improve upon Darwin’s crude interpretation of the 
evolutionary principle, understood in terms of random mutations, by postulating 
élan vital (vital impulse, vital impetus) as the principle of self-organization and 
spontaneous morphogenesis of living organism. Like Darwin’s work, The Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859), Bergson’s capital work, Creative 
Evolution (1907), puts the emphasis on the natural component of bio-ethics.
Nowadays neglected “ethics of reverence of life,” by Albert Schweitzer, shifts the 
focus from the biological factors to the primary relevance of the ethical component. 
Schweitzer admitted that the natural element provides a starting point, so often lost 
in speculative doctrines of philosophers. Yet, although the starting point, the natural 
is not its terminal point: “True philosophy must start from the most immediate and 
comprehensive fact of consciousness, which says: ‘I am life, which wills to live, in 
the midst of life, which wills to live’. This is not an ingenious dogmatic formula. 
Day by day, hour by hour, I live and move in it” (Schweitzer, 1923 [1989], 137). 
From this realization of the urge to live, I come to realize that the same urge is 
present in every living being, which leads me to the crucial realization of my ethical 
obligation toward all other life. It also leads to a new understanding of ethics, the 
center-piece of which would be bioethics, had Schweitzer known of this phrase: 
“Ethics consists … in my experiencing the compulsion to show to all will to live the 
same reverence as I do to my own. There we have given us that basic principle of the 
morals, which is a necessity of thought. It is good to maintain and to encourage life; 
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it is bad to destroy life or to obstruct it” (Schweitzer, 1923 [1989], 137-8; cf. 
Cicovacki, 2012).
Recent investigations usually overlook the contributions of Bergson and Schweitzer 
for the establishment and initial development of bioethics. To place the origin it’s 
always a conflicted matter. We already know that in 1926 a protestant pastor named 
Fritz Jahr wrote an article: “Life Sciences and the Teaching of Ethics,” in which he 
established the basis of a “Bioethical Imperative”: respect every living being in 
general as an end in itself and treat it, if possible, as such.”(Jahr, 1926 [2013], 21). 
In the year 1927, the German journal “Kosmos” published as an editorial the article: 
“Bio-Ethics: Reviewing the Ethical Relations of Human Beings Toward Animals 
and Plants,” in which Jahr further explained his vision and references.
While Bergson, Schweitzer, and Jahr were well known and widely respect in the 
third decade of the twentieth century, the beginning and the unfolding of the 
Second World War pushed their ideas away from the public consciousness. We will 
have to wait till the Nüremberg trials (1945-1946) to continue tracking the 
bioethical concerns. It was the atrocities and the violations of the most fundamental 
human rights that further legitimized the possibility of bioethical thinking. In 
following the path of evolution of this concept, we should quote an article of 
Warren Thomas Reich in which he proposed a “bi-located birth” for bioethics in the 
years 1970-1971: on the one hand, following the ideas of Van Rensselaer Potter, of 
the University of Wisconsin, and his publication: Bioethics: Bridge to the Future 
(Potter, 1971); on the other hand, the legacy of André Hellegers, of Georgetown 
University and the Kennedy Institute. The novelty of their bi-located perspective 
consists in introducing a bioethical conception linked to the medical paradigm. In 
words of Potter: “Bioethics is advanced as a new discipline that combines biological 
knowledge with a knowledge of human value systems… I chose bio– to represent 
biological knowledge, the science of living systems; and I chose –ethics to represent 
knowledge of human value systems.” (Reich, 1994, 321 [Potter 1975, 2297, 2299; 
cf. 1971, 2])
Since 2005, with the introduction of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights (UNESCO, 2005), the legal discourse organized in 28 articles 
presented the fundamental principles of bioethics set forth within a single text. “In 
dealing with ethical issues raised by medicine, life sciences and associated 
technologies as applied to human beings, the Declaration, as reflected in its title, 
anchors the principles it endorses in the rules that govern respect for human dignity, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms.” (UNESCO, 2005) We will have to 
analyze whether and how this normative frame contributes to our resolutions of 
problematic situations. 
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Finally, we should also consider such developments in the field as The Latin-American 
Dictionary of Bioethics, edited in 2008 by Dr. Juan Carlos Tealdi, Director of the 
Bioethics Committee of the Clinical Hospital, Buenos Aires, Argentina. This 
Dictionary is organized in accordance with major bioethical concerns and problematic 
areas; many authors have contributed to this project and the resulting Dictionary 
provides a powerful tool to reflect on the field. Tealdi states in the introduction to this 
Dictionary that the objective is “to think about bioethics from the various disciplines 
and moral visions that serve as a meeting point for critical and normative reflections 
related to life and living in Latin America” (Tealdi 2008, xxvii).
The aim in presenting this genealogy can now be stated more clearly. First, if our 
objective is to reflect on bioethical concerns in a certain time and context, it is 
necessary to historicize the concept in order to avoid the ideological blinkers. 
Second, the historicizing of the concept of bioethics does not mean only establishing 
a chronological order of events which lead us to understand this process in a 
sequential order. Rather, in the spirit of Foucault, the idea is to follow, in the history 
of the discipline, which ideas and conceptions were functional to the “established 
order,” for instance by getting financial funding and government support to develop 
bioethics as we know it today, far away from its original conception.
The age of techno-scientific rationality
Following this conceptual trail will help us to understand the different perspectives 
that constitute the field of bioethics. But it would be desirable to organize the field 
in accordance with “traditional” and “emerging” scenarios of bioethical concerns. 
The traditional scenarios could be: abortion, assisted suicide, euthanasia, organ 
donation, eugenics, and clinical investigation. On the other hand, there are also 
emerging scenarios and new fields of research, such as: cloning, stem-cells research, 
genetic engineering, and reproductive technologies. This distinction is only 
methodological and, of course, subject to changes. But it is also the first distinction 
that could help us to understand how Science (with capital S, because sometimes 
science is assumed to have a quasi-religious authority in our age) and technological 
developments might be questioning the foundations of human existence and 
experience in the world. 
The distinction between traditional and emerging scenarios of bioethics has two 
objectives. First, it enables us to reflect on how technological breakthroughs affect 
our ways of living in this world. The foundation of instrumental rationality 
contributes to the shape of a particular kind of subjectivity: the hypermodern subject, 
in terms of Lipovetsky and Charles (Lipovetsky & Charles, 2005). 
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Second, this distinction between bioethical scenarios reveals yet another tacit 
assumption: our world is being governed by the techno-scientific rationality. Since the 
rise of Modernity, technology and market have become intricately intertwined. The 
ideal of modern science, as defined by Bacon and Descartes, was to impose Man’s rule 
over nature: Man as the “Lord and Master” of nature. This ideal of domination, 
following the path of this anthropocentric point of view, has been conceived in terms 
of instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality has capital consequences for the 
politics of society. Another issue that we should consider is the flow of power in our 
societies. As mentioned before, under the scope of biopolitics, we should consider the 
different forms of power, typical for our “modern societies,” which are supportive of 
the capitalistic model. Following Foucault’s ideas, biopolitics considers the extension of 
state power over both the physical and social bodies of a population. Thus, a possible 
definition of “biopolitics” could include the political application of bioethics. 
One case scenario in which we can better analyze this claim is the current 
development in reprogenetics. While this term has many connotations, we will use it 
here to designate the use of technologies for human reproduction. Such 
technological assistance to individuals and couples who cannot conceive naturally 
represents a step forward in the realization of the ancient desire of forming family 
which includes a child (or children). With its reversal of the natural reproductive 
(in)capacities, the development of assisted reproductive technologies can lead to a 
fundamental change of the world as we have known it. Following Thomas Kuhn’s 
ideas and terminology, one could even argue that this development is bringing 
about a “paradigm shift” and introducing a new “scientific revolution.”
All guiding principles of reprogenetics have been established under the auspice of 
instrumental reason. A reproduction of the species is dissected into the steps that are 
susceptible to being all addressed and altered by techno-scientific means. Such a 
“division of labor” makes it possible to work on different phases of reproduction, 
which in the future may enable the stopping, manipulating and/or redirecting the 
further evolution of the human species. Such possibilities are the reasons why 
science appears nowadays as having unlimited power and as capable of affecting the 
fundamental aspects of our subjective constitution and the human condition as a 
whole. Insofar as the development of reprogenetics erodes the foundations of the 
traditional model of family and opens up to a wide range of new family models, this 
rapid development poses serious questions concerning the future of the human race. 
A skeptic may nevertheless wonder why we believe that reprogenetics presents a 
privileged case scenario for the contemporary bioethical analysis. The main reason 
for this is that this scenario presents multiple complexities involving different 
disciplinary fields: the field of reproductive medicine, the area of technological 
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development that enables the techniques such as the Intra-Cytoplasmic Sperm 
Injection (ICSI),3 and the extensive field of subjective dispositions associated with 
family establishment, including the desire of a parental couple to have a child. This 
scenario is also intertwined with biopolitics, in the sense understood by Foucault, 
which we mentioned before. Hence, we should also deliberate on the scope and 
effects that new legislations, caused by the development of reprogenetics, may exert 
over society. Consider, for example, the implementation of the Law No. 26.862, 
introduced in Argentina, in 2013, which guarantees a comprehensive access to 
medical techniques and health-care procedures of assisted reproduction. This 
legislation assures that, from now on, more prepaid health care coverage will cover 
the assisted reproductive treatments for citizens, who, for a variety of reasons, 
cannot conceive naturally. We should carefully observe, then, the scope and effect 
that new legislations have over society. This is only one example of how public 
policy can extend its power over the biological and social body. 
Understanding the right to conceive as a fundamental human right (which is the spirit 
in which this legislation is introduced), together with a need to follow this rapid 
technological progress with asound public policy, demands of us to reflect on both 
objective and subjective consequences of these policy implementations. The field of 
“assisted reproductive technologies” presents enormous controversies in the fields of 
science, medicine, technology, moral, ethics, and religion. Such technologies raise 
monumental questions in the field of subjective choices and decisions; they challenge 
us to rethink both components of bio-ethics and to establish clearly and decisively 
what our priorities are and what it means to be and live like a human being.
A final word could, then, be that there is a deep need to explore this intrinsic tension 
between the natural and the ethical components of bioethics in a historical context. 
The field of reprogenetics serves as an example of how the emerging technologies 
and the international policies that follow them lead in one direction (in the direction 
of the natural component), while the genealogy of bioethics points us toward its 
counterpart (its ethical component). Our hope is that a further development of the 
Foucauldian notion of biopolitics might guide us toward a fruitful resolution of this 
tension in a not so distant future.  
3 There are many objections to the Intra-Cytoplasmic Sperm Injection procedure, in which a single sperm is 
injected directly into an egg, in a medically controlled clinical environment, outside the uterus of the female. This 
medical capability can have major consequences on our reproductive techniques, for it produces extra-corporeal 
embryos.
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SAŽETAK
Naš rad bavi se napetošću koja postoji u samom nazivu bioetike, napetošću između prirodnih 
i etičkih komponenti. Ispitujemo podrijetlo naziva “bioetika”, neke od njegovih sadašnjih 
praksi i spornih pitanja i predviđamo budući razvoj ovog rastućeg područja. Prošlost i 
sadašnjost ne donose prihvaćeno rješenje o napetosti ovog pitanja, a nadamo se da će, 
fokusirajući se na njegov značaj, daljnja istraživanja moći razjasniti i odrediti sam identitet 
tog područja. 
Ključne riječi: bioetika, biopolitika, genealogija, tehnoznanstvena racionalnost, tehnologije 
potpomognute oplodnje

